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Issue 48 – November 2007

Contents

Cases
Statutory Instruments

Features
Articles
News

Events
Discounts (how to book and claim discounts)
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Cases

1. Gidvani v London Rent Assessment Panel

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 263 (October)
Hearing date: 18 October 2007
Court: Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Judge: Sullivan J
Summary: rent restriction – rent – determination of fair rent

In July 2005, the claimant applied for the registration of a fair rent in respect of her premises. After conducting an inspection, a rent assessment officer rejected the application, determining that a lower rent was appropriate. The claimant objected, following which the matter was referred to a rent assessment panel. The panel effectively upheld the officer's determination. The claimant appealed.

She submitted that the panel had erred in deciding to assess her rent at such a low level, in light of the fact that her property was in good condition, as evidenced by photographs and the comments of her surveyor. She further submitted that the panel made unfair deductions on the grounds of “scarcity”, and that it failed to take into account the registered rent of the premises in 1993, which was material.

The appeal would be dismissed.

In the circumstances, no conceivable error of law could be identified with the panel's decision. It had been entitled to assess the rent as it had on the basis of the inspection its officer carried out; it had been entitled to make deductions on the grounds of “scarcity”, and the 1993 rent was not a material consideration. Accordingly, the decision of the panel would stand.

Case annotations in other services: Gidvani v London Rent Assessment Panel [2007] All ER (D) 263 (October)
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2. Clark v London Borough of Havering and another

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 276 (October)
Hearing date: 18 October 2007
Court: Queen's Bench Division
Judge: King J
Relevant legislation: Highways Act 1980 section 41, 58
Summary: highway – maintenance – scope of duty to maintain

The claimant sustained injuries when he stepped into an uncovered stopcock box situated on a grass-covered patch of land located between his house and a footpath. He brought an action against the highway authority, which was responsible for the grass verge, and Essex and Suffolk Water Plc (Essex Water), which was the owner of the stopcock box and responsible for its maintenance. The claimant contended that the highway authority owed him a duty of care in negligence and that that duty had been breached by the highway authority's failure to take reasonable measures to maintain and repair the stopcock. He further contended that the highway authority and Essex Water were in breach of their statutory duty to maintain the highway under section 41 of the Highways Act 1980. The highway authority and Essex Water conceded that they had been in breach of their statutory duties; however, the highway authority submitted that it had a statutory defence to the action pursuant to section 58 of the 1980 Act. It submitted, inter alia, that an inspector had examined the highway and had not noticed the missing stopcock. The judge, in the event, found that the highway authority was in breach of its common-law duty of care by failing to maintain the highway. He also found that the highway authority and Essex Water were in breach of their duties under section 41 of the 1980 Act and dismissed the statutory defence. The highway authority appealed.

It submitted, inter alia, that the judge had erred in finding that it owed a common law duty of care to maintain the highway. It further contended that the judge had erred in finding that it had not been afforded a statutory defence to the statutory breach.

The appeal would be allowed.

The highway authority was not the occupier of the highway and had not owed a common law duty of care to the claimant. It had had an absolute statutory duty to maintain the highway; however, that duty could not have been converted into a common law duty of care to maintain. The mere omission to carry out an act, even though that omission might have given rise to a reasonably foreseeable injury, would not have been sufficient to give rise to a common-law duty. Moreover, there was no question that any assumption of responsibility existed on the part of the highway authority. The judge found that the highway authority had not made out the statutory defence afforded by section 58 of the Highways Act 1980; however it was quite clear that he had approached that issue from the wrong starting point.

Case annotations in other services: Clark v London Borough of Havering and another [2007] All ER (D) 276 (October) 
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3. Harouki v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea

Citation: [2007] EWCA Civ 1000
Hearing date: 17 October 2007
Court: Court of Appeal, Civil Division
Judges: Ward, Thomas and Richards LJJ
Relevant legislation: Housing Act 1996, part vii, sections 175(3), 210
Summary: housing – homeless person – duty of housing authority to provide accommodation

The claimant lived with her husband and their five children in a self-contained flat on the second floor of a purpose-built block. The flat had three bedrooms, a living room, a kitchen, and a bathroom. The claimant and her husband occupied the first bedroom with their 10-year-old son and four-year-old daughter. The second bedroom was occupied by their daughters, aged 17 and 18, respectively, and the third and smallest bedroom was occupied by their 20-year-old son who suffered from obesity. The accommodation was fit for only five-and-a-half persons and, therefore, exceeded the space standard for overcrowding, meaning that the claimant was committing a summary offence under section 327 of the Housing Act 1985 by causing or permitting the flat to be overcrowded. The claimant suffered from depression, an under-active thyroid and back pain. The defendant local housing authority accepted that the claimant's current accommodation was not ideal in terms of size and floor level, but on her renewed application to be treated as homeless, the housing adviser concluded that the accommodation was not so crowded , nor so difficult to access, that it was unreasonable for the claimant and her family to occupy. The claimant sought a review of that decision claiming that she was, in effect, currently homeless and that she therefore triggered the emergency duties falling upon the local housing authority in part vii of the Housing Act 1996. The housing review officer stated that part vii of the 1996 Act was designed to function as a safety net for those facing crisis homelessness and was never intended to be used as an alternative route into social housing. He concluded that there were many local families in more severely overcrowded conditions and that the claimant's circumstances of overcrowding were not exceptional. He went on to find that the claimant was not homeless, and that it was reasonable for her to continue to occupy the accommodation. The claimant's appeal against that decision was dismissed, and the judge found that the housing review officer had not erred in his decision. The claimant appealed against that decision. She submitted that it was unreasonable to continue to occupy the accommodation when doing so constituted a criminal offence, and that her and her son's ill-health had been exacerbated by continuing to have to live in overcrowded conditions.

The appeal would be dismissed.

If suitability and reasonableness were related concepts, then statutory overcrowding had to receive similar treatment, whether looking at it in light of section 175(3) or section 210 of the Housing Act 1996. If, by virtue of the express recognition in section 210, that overcrowding did not necessarily render the accommodation unsuitable, it had to follow that overcrowding did not necessarily prevent it being reasonable for the claimant to continue to occupy the accommodation for section 175(3) purposes. In all the circumstances, the housing review officer had been fully entitled to consider the prevailing circumstances in the borough, including the overcrowding in the borough. Having had regard to the family's personal circumstances, he had not been acting illegally or irrationally in concluding that it was reasonable to require the claimant and her family to continue to occupy the flat. Accordingly, there had been no error of law in the housing review officer's decision, and the findings of the judge had been correct.

Awua v Brent London Borough Council [1995] 3 All ER 493, Elrify v Westminster City Council [2007] All ER (D) 405 (March) considered.

Case annotations in other services: Harouki v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2007] All ER (D) 243 (October); Awua v Brent London Borough Council [1995] 3 All ER 493; Elrify v Westminster City Council [2007] All ER (D) 405 (March)
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4. Hunte v E Bottomley & Sons Ltd

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 220 (October)
Hearing date: 16 October 2007
Court: Court of Appeal, Civil Division
Judges: Ward, Arden and Smith LJJ
Summary: landlord and tenant – covenant – quiet enjoyment

The defendant was the owner of a large industrial complex. It let premises in the complex to the claimant for use as a cafe. The lease gave the claimant a right of way, both vehicular and pedestrian, over the internal road in the complex. That right of way was subject to a proviso that the claimant, inter alia, obey any regulation of the landlord relating to parking, unloading vehicles or the direction of traffic. There were two entrances to the industrial complex, one to the north and one to the south, with the internal road linking them. In the south of the complex, there was an old mill. In the north of the complex, there were industrial buildings that were still in use. The claimant's cafe was just south of the middle of the complex, on the first floor of a building. The defendant blocked the south entrance of the complex. Signs were placed there telling traffic that the road was closed and directing traffic further along the public highway to the north entrance of the complex. Entrance to the cafe was, therefore, only via the north entrance. That was in pursuance of a plan by the defendant to sell off the mill for development as private housing. The defendant then erected a wall completely blocking the internal road and separating the north side of the complex from the south, with the result that there was no vehicular or pedestrian access to the claimant's cafe. Access to cafe was subsequently allowed to resume, but customers had to pass through a passageway through a building by the wall. The claimant, accordingly, brought an action for breach of his covenant of quiet enjoyment and his right of way. The judge found, inter alia, that in building the wall, there had been a substantial derogation from the grant in the lease. He found a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, and breach of the right of way. The defendant appealed.

It submitted, inter alia, that the judge had erred in law since the building of the wall fell within the terms of the proviso to the right of way as a measure to direct the flow of traffic. It argued that, therefore, there were no breaches of the right of way or the covenant of quiet enjoyment.

The appeal would be dismissed.

The defendant's argument was utterly hopeless. If any meaning were to be given to the proviso, then it had to mean that the defendant could regulate the direction in which traffic could circulate. The defendant could not simply block the road. Moreover, there was no answer to the judgment that there was a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment. The proviso was limited to the right of way and did not and could not affect the covenant for quiet enjoyment.

Case annotations in other services: Hunte v E Bottomley & Sons Ltd [2007] All ER (D) 220 (October)
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5. Corus UK Ltd v Erewash Borough Council

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 181 (October)
Hearing date: 12 October 2007
Court: Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)
Judge: Burton J
Relevant legislation: Town and Country Planning Act 1990 section 287
Summary: town and country planning – development – local plan

The claimant owned a brownfield site known as the Oakwell Brickworks (OB). The site was derelict and contaminated, which prevented it from being developed, but it had been allocated for residential housing development in proposal H1 of the Erewash local plan and the subsequent Derby and Derbyshire joint structure plan. The first deposit draft of the Erewash replacement local plan retained proposal H1, but that proposal was omitted in the second deposit draft, by reason of the fact that OB was to be included in an extension to the green belt. Further, the defendant local authority stated that it had decided to delete OB from the plan on the basis that the site was unlikely to be developed in the prescribed planning period in light of the costs of decontaminating the site and that sites could only be adopted for housing that were “suitable” and “available” for redevelopment, in accordance with government guidance. Although the claimant had not applied for planning permission in respect of OB, it objected to the authority's conclusions, wishing to protect itself should it decide in the future that it wanted to develop the site. As a result, an inspector appointed by the authority held a local plan inquiry. A housing topic paper was considered, and an urban capacity study was undertaken. The inspector made various findings from those documents and, in particular, one recommendation that the local plan be modified so that OB was reinstated. The authority decided that, in light of updated housing figures in the urban capacity study, there was no need to reinstate OB and, further, that there was no need to retain proposal H1. Accordingly, those parts of the plan were quashed. The claimant consequently issued a challenge under section 287 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

The claimant submitted that the inspector's report contained an unconditional recommendation that OB would be included in proposal H1, irrespective of, inter alia, the authority's policy on housing figures, which, in effect, amounted to an “off-set” of the over-provision of housing in the sub-area that OB was situated against the under-provision of housing in an adjacent sub-area.

The application would be dismissed.

It was settled law that a local planning authority was not required to accept a recommendation of an inspector, but if it decided to follow that course, it had to provide adequate and intelligible reasons for doing so. In the instant case, the authority had quite clearly determined not to include proposal H1 and, in particular, OB on the basis that it could off-set the over-provision of housing in the sub-area that OB was situated against the under-provision of housing in an adjacent area, as identified by the updated urban capacity study. That was a sufficient reason for it to depart from the inspector's recommendation. Accordingly, the adopted plan would stand.

Stirk v Bridgnorth District Council (1996) 73 P & CR 439, Miller v Wycombe District Council [1997] JPL 951 and Welsh Development Agency v Carmarthenshire County Council [2000] JPL 692 applied.

Case annotations in other services: Corus UK Ltd v Erewash Borough Council [2007] All ER (D) 181 (Oct); Stirk v Bridgnorth District Council (1996) 73 P & CR 439;  Miller v Wycombe District Council [1997] JPL 951; Welsh Development Agency v Carmarthenshire County Council [2000] JPL 692
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6. Lawntown Ltd v Camenzuli and another

Citation: [2007] EWCA Civ 949
Hearing date: 10 October 2007
Court: Court of Appeal, Civil Division
Judges: Gage, Richards and Lawrence Collins LJJ
Relevant legislation: Housing Act 1985, section 610
Summary: restrictive covenant affecting land – application for variation – planning permission having been granted for conversion of single dwelling house into two or more separate dwelling houses

The appellants lived in a semi-detached house, originally designed for occupation as a single-family dwelling house and located in an estate where most of the properties were of a similar character. The respondent, a property development company, purchased the freehold of the house next door to the appellants'. The respondent began work on the property to convert it into flats, without having obtained planning permission. The appellants and other neighbours objected. Conversion into flats was prohibited by restrictive covenants to which the property was subject. In due course, the local planning authority granted permission for change of use from a single dwelling house to two self-contained flats. The respondent made an application in the county court under section 610 of the Housing Act 1985 for a variation of the restrictive covenants, so as to permit the conversion of the property, and the appellants were appointed to represent all the objectors. The judge held that, save in exceptional circumstances, a court considering an application under section 610 should not have regard to planning matters that had already been considered and decided by the local planning authority, but should have regard to considerations that were not before the planning authority or were not relevant to its decision. He granted the application. The appellants appealed.

The appeal would be dismissed.

The 1985 Act did not create any presumption in favour of the variation of a restrictive covenant where planning permission had been granted, let alone any duty to vary the covenant. It was for the court to make its own assessment of the relevant factors and the weight to be accorded to them. It should not leave matters out of account, or give them no weight in the overall balancing exercise, merely because they had already been considered by the local planning authority in granting planning permission. The court's task under section 610, although triggered by the grant of planning permission, was separate from the planning process and required an independent exercise of judgment. That did not mean that the court had to second guess the authority's planning judgments or reach a view on the correctness of the grant of planning permission. It was simply that the authority's factual assessment was not determinative, however careful it might have been, and the court had to examine the facts for itself and carry out its own balancing exercise. To carry out that task properly, the court had to have regard to the interests sought to be protected by the restrictive covenant, and the extent to which those interests would be harmed by the proposed variation, as well as to the interests of the person seeking to vary the covenant and the advantages that would accrue from the variation.

It followed that, in the instant case, the judge erred in confining his attention to matters the local planning authority had not taken into account in reaching its decision to grant planning permission, and his exercise of discretion could not stand. Exercising its own discretion in the matter, however, the court had come to the same conclusion as the judge.

Sarum Trust v Duke of Westminster (1953) 161 Estates Gazette 104, Re Martin's Application [1989] 1 EGLR 193, South Bucks District Council v Porter, Chichester District Council v Searle, Wrexham County Borough Council v Berry [2003] 3 All ER 1, Re Hunt's application (1997) 73 P&CR 126 considered.

Case annotations in other services: Lawntown Ltd v Camenzuli and another [2007] All ER (D) 119 (October); Sarum Trust v Duke of Westminster (1953) 161 Estates Gazette 104; Re Martin's Application [1989] 1 EGLR 193; South Bucks District Council v Porter, Chichester District Council v Searle, Wrexham County Borough Council v Berry [2003] 3 All ER 1; Re Hunt's application (1997) 73 P&CR 126
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7. Asda Stores Ltd v Salya Investments Ltd

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 112 (October)
Hearing date: 9 October 2007
Court: Chancery Division
Judge: Morgan J
Summary: landlord and tenant – rent – review

In 1980, the claimant obtained planning permission for the erection of a superstore, petrol station and car park on a piece of land. That permission was not implemented, and the claimant successfully applied again in 1981 with an amended plan. In 1982, the defendant granted the claimant a lease of the site, subsequent to which building took place in accordance with the planning permission. The lease contained rent review provisions, including one providing for reviews to take place at five-yearly intervals from a specified date, and one providing for intermediate rent reviews. It stipulated, inter alia, that, in the event of buildings additional to those for which planning permission had been obtained being built, additional rent would be payable. In 2007, the claimant carried out various works with the consent of the defendant, including an extension to the left hand corner of the store. The claimant brought proceedings, seeking a declaration, inter alia, that those works should be regarded as improvements by the tenant, and they were to be disregarded for the purposes of the rent review provisions.

An issue arose, inter alia, as to whether an extension to the original building fell within the rent review provisions or the application of those provisions was restricted to the erection of a freestanding building.

The court ruled:
On the true construction of the lease, any building by way of extension was to be taken into account for the purposes of both rent review provisions. Furthermore, there was no good reason to distinguish commercially between a freestanding building and an extension to the original building.

Case annotations in other services: Asda Stores Ltd v Salya Investments Ltd [2007] All ER (D) 112 (October)
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8. Sargeant and others v Reece

Citation: [2007] All ER (D) 58 (October)
Hearing date: 4 October 2007
Court: Chancery Division
Judge: Edward Bartley-Jones QC sitting as a deputy judge of the High Court
Summary: contract – term – construction

The deceased and the defendant were brother and sister. The first claimant was the deceased's wife, and the second and third claimants were, respectively, his daughter and his solicitor. The claimants were the executors of the deceased's estate. The case concerned 45.535 acres of agricultural land that had substantial long-term development potential, owned by the deceased and the defendant. As of March 1974, the value of the land was calculated for probate reasons to be £21,375, or £475 per acre. In 1990, the deceased and the defendant agreed to sell, inter alia, 39 acres of the land for a fixed consideration of £3,020,000. Ultimately, the sale fell through; however, numerous parties showed considerable interest in taking options over various parts of the land. At that time, the potential value of the land was between £250,000 and £300,000 per acre. In 1995, the deceased and the defendant entered into a dissolution agreement, whereby the farming partnership between them ceased to exist, and closing accounts were drawn up. Clause 6 of the agreement provided: “[the defendant] shall join in and sign any document that may be required to vest all partnership assets in [the deceased]”. On final payment under the 1995 agreement, the deceased paid to the defendant half of the 1974 probate value of the land, namely £10,687.50. In 2000, the deceased and the defendant entered into a deed regulating the position between them in relation to an option agreement granted to a third party. Following the execution of the 2000 deed in relation to the land, the deceased issued proceedings seeking to enforce the terms of clause 6 of the 1995 agreement and have the land transferred into his sole name. The defendant sought rectification of the 1995 agreement.

The defendant contended that the essential common intention behind the 1995 agreement, as evidenced by contemporaneous documents, was that the land, following the dissolution of the farming partnership, remained vested in her and the deceased as tenants in common in equal shares. The claimants argued that the defendant had not proven that the requisite common intention had been formed and that the deceased had acquired the land under clause 6 of the agreement.

The court ruled:
On the true construction of the 1995 agreement, it was the common intention of the parties, outwardly expressed and continuing up to execution of the 1995 agreement, that the land should, following dissolution of the partnership, belong beneficially to both of them equally. It was difficult to see how the deceased could have believed he had become entitled to more than 45 acres of land at a valuation that was 20 years out of date. The court would grant an order for rectification in the terms, inter alia, that the land would be deemed to have been held on trust for the defendant and the deceased, and subsequently his estate, as beneficial tenants in common in equity in equal shares.

Case annotations in other services: Sargeant and others v Reece [2007] All ER (D) 58 (October)
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Statutory Instruments

1. Agricultural Holdings (Units of Production) (England) Order 2007

Number: 2007/2968
Enabling power: Agricultural Holdings Act 1986
Commencement: 7 November 2007
Summary: This Order prescribes units of production for the assessment of the productive capacity of agricultural land situated in England and sets out the amount to be regarded as the net annual income from each such unit for the year 7 November 2007 to 6 November 2008, inclusive for certain purposes of the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986. This Order revokes the Agricultural Holdings (Units of Production) (England) Order 2006.
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2. Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007 (Commencement No 1) Order 2007

Number: 2007/2934
Enabling power: Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007
Commencement: 12 October 2007
Summary: This Order brings into force provisions of the Consumers, Estate Agents and Redress Act 2007. These provisions (section 53(1) and schedule 6) amend the Estate Agents Act 1979 to provide for redress schemes dealing with complaints about estate agents.
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3. Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (Commencement No 14) Order 2007

Number: 2007/2595
Enabling power: Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000
Commencement: 1 October 2007
Summary: This Act brings into force on 1 October 2007, in relation to England, the remainder of section 69 of the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000.
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4. Houses in Multiple Occupation (Specified Educational Establishments) (England) (No 2) Regulations 2007

Number: 2007/2601
Enabling power: Housing Act 2004
Commencement: 1 October 2007
Summary: These Regulations revoke and re-enact the Houses in Multiple Occupation (Specified Educational Establishments) (England) Regulations 2007 and specify additional educational establishments that were not listed in the schedule to those Regulations.

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Features

1. Authorities waste no time in tackling litter louts

Local authorities are getting tougher on litter louts. Vanessa Goodchild-Bradley, who leads the Local Government Association policy directorate on litter issues, explains that the most recent legislation granting local authorities new powers to enforce penalties for littering is the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005.

She explains that the purpose of the fines and penalties is "to penalise illegal behaviour and to encourage people and businesses to be more responsible". In addition, "by giving councils stronger powers on enforcement, there is also more incentive for the council to invest in its enforcement capacity and to then tackle a wider range of environmental crimes," she says.

Local authorities have intensified efforts to reduce litter on the street in recent years. Since 2003, the number of penalties has risen by more than 300 per cent. According to Goodchild–Bradley, this is due to a number of factors.

"Councils have expanded their enforcement teams and invested in more training, so they are now able to target particular problems such as organised fly-tipping. It is still early days for many smaller councils, as some of the powers are very new. Proactive enforcement has been shown to be very effective, especially when accompanied by a high-profile education and awareness campaign. Obstacles include catching the offenders, the cost of pursuing unpaid fines and inadequate penalties imposed by the courts when councils do prosecute non-payers."

Goodchild-Bradley explains how the money collected from fines and on-the-spot penalties is used. "The council usually ploughs the money back into its enforcement team so that they can expand numbers, increase training and target particular problems. Most councils put a great deal more money into enforcement than they are currently receiving in fines. However, enforcement helps to create cleaner, safer streets. This, in turn, makes residents and businesses more satisfied and engaged with their local area and attracts inward investment, jobs, etc."
As to the future, councils look set to continue tackling litter offences and protecting the local environment. "Penalties are likely to increase in line with inflation. Councils would like tougher penalties for repeat offenders", Goodchild–Bradley concludes.

Relevant legislation: Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005

(21/09/07)
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2. Green and pleasant land for all

The authorities in charge of putting up gates and stiles in the countryside have recently come under pressure to take those with mobility problems into account. Recently, the government has stepped up its access to the countryside campaign with increased coastal access, the “Discovering Lost Ways” project and now new legislation (The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 (Commencement No 14) Order 2007) provides greater access for those with mobility problems.

As a result gates and stiles will now be subject to improvement and/or replacement to enhance access for those with mobility problems. A Defra spokesperson said: "The provisions mean that when a local authority uses its existing power (under the Highways Act 1980, section 147) to authorise an application from a landowner for the erection of stiles, gates, etc, on a footpath or bridleway, they now have a statutory duty to take the needs of persons with mobility problems into account."

He adds: "The legislation also introduces a formal process enabling a local authority to enter into an agreement with a landowner to improve a stile, gate, etc, for the benefit of persons with mobility problems. Local authorities do this already on an informal basis, but this new provision enables any such improvement to become legally part of the right of way and, therefore, be retained in perpetuity."

The principal purpose of the plans is to encourage local authorities to take a strategic view of their rights of way network to provide better for the needs of those with mobility problems.

However, Defra were keen to point out that the legislation is primarily aimed at those with mobility problems, rather than the disabled: "We believe that there is a large degree of overlap between these two definitions. Persons with mobility problems could encompass, for example, people who are elderly but not disabled. Although we are commencing these powers now, we believe that local authorities are already taking mobility and disability issues into account in the rights of way duties because of the requirements of the Disability Discrimination Act."

Relevant legislation: Highways Act 1980, s 147; Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000

(25/09/07)

Legal News Analysis
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Articles

1. The Local Authority as applicant for the modification or discharge of a restrictive covenant

Journal: Journal of Planning and Environmental Law
Citation: [2007] JPL 1564
Issue date: 1 November 2007
Author: Clive Moys
Summary: Considers the situation in which a local authority is the applicant for the modification or discharge of a restrictive covenant which burdens land in its ownership.
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2. The planning process and judicial control: the case for better judicial involvement and control

Journal: Journal of Planning and Environmental Law
Citation: [2007] JPL 1570
Issue date: 1 November 2007
Author: Alec Samuels
Summary: Reports that Kate Barker's report on land use planning has again raised the issue of judicial review and the planning process.
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3. Zero-sum games

Journal: Building
Citation: 5 October 2007, 62
Issue date: 5 October 2007
Author: Antonia Brandes
Summary: Reports that the government is offering lower stamp duty to those who buy more energy-efficient homes. The idea is that the purchaser pays less in stamp duty, but a higher price for their zero-carbon home to reflect increased construction costs.
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4. What's exceptional?

Journal: New Law Journal
Citation: 157 NLJ 1374
Issue date: 5 October 2007
Author: Sarah Greer
Relevant legislation: Trusts of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996
Summary: Discusses how five consecutive increases in the Bank of England's base rate over the past year have led to a growing number of repossessions of family homes, both by mortgage lenders and trustees in bankruptcy.
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5. Short, but not really appropriate

Journal: Estates Gazette
Citation: 29 September 2007, 152
Issue date: 29 September 2007
Authors: Martin Edwards and John Martin
Relevant legislation: Environmental Protection Act 1990
Relevant cases: R (on the application of National Grid Gas plc) v Environment Agency [2007] UKHL 30, [2007] 3 All ER 877
Summary: Examines the landmark House of Lords decision concerning land liability: R (on the application of National Grid Gas plc (formerly Transco plc) v Environment Agency. Argues the logic of their lordships' ruling is hard to accept in the light of the background to Part 2A of the 1990 Act. Argues the decision potentially emasculates environmental legislation.
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This e-alert is not intended to provide comprehensive records of information concerning the property sector. If you have any feedback or suggestions, please email propertysection@lawsociety.org.uk. This e-alert was created in conjunction with LexisNexis UK Legal Updater Service. For further information about any of the articles, please contact sabina.smith@lexisnexis.co.uk. The views expressed by the Legal Analysis interviewees are not necessarily those of the proprietor.
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